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Reverse LBO Underpricing: 
Information Asymmetry 
Or Price Support? 
Gregory Noronha, Arizona State University - West 
Kenneth Yung, Old Dominion University 
Abstract 
Most studies attribute the underpricing of initial public offerings of equity securities to 
the ex ante uncertainty resulting from the information differential between the firm go-
ing public and the market. Ruud (1991,1993), however, proposes that underpricing 
could result from underwriter price support in the early after-market. In this paper we 
examine firms that were once public, went private via leveraged buyout and then went 
-jiublic- agaln.- ll is reasonable to expect tftatsince these reverse LBOs (RLBOs) we_r_e __ - ----------- ------
once publicly traded, they should have less of an information differential with the mar-
ket than firms going public for the first time. Our tests indicate that there is little or no 
information asymmetry between RLBOs and the market. We find that RLBO initial re-
turns are more consistent with price support than with information asymmetry. 
1. Introduction 
C onsiderable evidence exists that initial public offerings of equity (IPOs) are 
underpriced( 1). Until recently most 
studies attributed the underpricing of IPOs to the 
ex-ante uncertainty resulting from differential in-
formation between either issuers and underwrit-
ers or between classes of investors(2). Ruud 
( 1991, 1993), however, proposes that underpric-
ing of IPOs could exist because of underwriter 
price support in the after-market. According to 
Ruud, the presence of underwriter support could 
censor the negative tail of the returns distribution 
in the early after-market period resulting in a 
positively skewed leptokurtic distribution during 
that period. The gradual removal of price sup-
port then permits the distribution to return to its 
expected symmetric shape. 
Comments and Questions concerning this article 
should be sent directly to the authors. 
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In this paper we investigate whether the 
underpricing of reverse LBOs (RLBOs) is due to 
differential information, price support, or a com-
bination of both factors. Reverse LBOs are firms 
that were once publicly held, went private via a 
leveraged buyout, and were then taken public 
again. It is reasonable to expect that these 
RLBOs, given the fact that they were once pub-
licly traded, have a lower degree of information 
asymmetry than firms that go public for the first 
time. In an early study of RLBOs or "second" 
IPOs (SIPOs), Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989a) conclude that SIPOs are underpriced but, 
because their degree of information asymmetry is 
less than that of IPOs, their underpricing is also 
commensurately less. Whereas Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens' findings_ are consistent with a lower 
degree of information asymmetry for RLBOs, 
they do not explicitly test for the presence of in-
formation asymmetry or for the possibility that 
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RLBO underpricing could be driven by a com-
peting theory. Our findings in this paper support 
those of Muscarella and Vetsuypens that RLBOs 
are significantly less underpriced than IPOs. 
However, with regard to the reason for RLBO 
underpricing, our results are more consistent 
with the arguments of price support by under-
writers than those of information asymmetry. 
We find that variables that proxy for in-
formation asymmetry and have been successful 
in explaining IPO underpricing have virtually no 
explanatory power in the case of RLBOs. On the 
other hand, we find considerable statistical evi-
dence that underwriters intervene in the early 
after-market to support RLBO prices. The re-
mainder of the paper is organized as follows: In 
section II we briefly review extant theories of 
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randomly. Thus, on average, the uninformed in-
vestors suffer from the winner's curse and, ab-
sent some form of compensation, will exit the 
market. If informed investors are unable to ex-
haust the supply of issues, uninformed investors 
are needed in the market and underpricing be-
comes the incentive for them to remain. Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), Johnson and Miller (1988) and 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989b) all find sup-
port for the adverse selection hypothesis. 
Tinic (1988) proposes that, if underwrit-
ers and issuers face a potential legal liability 
from investors believing they have been misled 
into a nonprofitable endeavor, they may under-
price in order to have a 'buffer' against litiga-
tion. 
IPO underpricing. Section III contains a descrip- A new line of arguments in the under-
tion of the data and the empirical results, and pricing literature (Welch 1988, Allen and Faul-
- --~-section-IV-concludes-. --------------·aber-198~)-;--amI-Grinbtatr-anu-Hwang-1989-J ___ - -
2. Theories of Underpricing 
With the exception of Ruud (1991, 1993), 
theories advanced to explain the underpricing 
phenomenon are predominantly based on asym-
metric information. Baron (1982), proposes that 
underwriters' information about the new issue 
market is superior to that of issuing firms. Con-
sequently, and under the assumption that issuers 
are unable to monitor their efforts, the under-
writers have an incentive to underprice in order 
to minimize their risk in selling the entire amount 
committed to outside investors. Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) show, however, that underpricing caused 
by the investment banker's superior information 
is temporary at best since a consistent policy of 
significant underpricing could result in loss of the 
issuer's business to competitors. 
In a theory of adverse selection, Rock 
( 1986) suggests that the abnormal return from 
underpricing is the compensation required by 
uninformed investors to prevent them from 
leaving the market. In Rock's model there are 
two groups of investors - the informed and the 
uninformed. The informed subscribe to only 
'good' issues whereas the uninformed subscribe 
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suggests that underpricing is employed by issuers 
as a signal of market potential. According to 
these theories, underpricing is a cost borne by is-
suers to entice potential investors to collect in-
formation on the firm and establish its true value 
in the secondary market. A high quality firm 
will, consequently, underprice more because 
once its true value is established, it can "cash in" 
by obtaining a higher price for subsequent of-
ferings. The initial cost of underpricing is thus 
offset by the benefits of future offerings. 
In a distinct departure from the theories 
of asymmetric information that advocate a delib-
erate decision to underprice, Ruud (1991,1993) 
advances the view that initial high IPO returns 
stem from underwriter price support in the IPO 
market. Such support may be achieved by the 
underwriter placing a standing purchase order at 
or slightly below the offer price. Price support 
effectively limits the number of negative returns 
and censors the negative tail of the initial returns 
distribution, possibly producing positive mean 
initial returns even if offering prices are set at the 
true expected market value. The Securities Act 
of 1934 permits underwriters to legally intervene 
in order to support IPO prices, ostensibly to sta-
bilize the price and minimize underwriter losses 
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from temporary price pressure during the selling 
period(3). That stabilization by underwriters is 
not an uncommon phenomenon is documented by 
Hess and Frost (1982). Ruud (1993) reports that 
57 percent of the seasoned equity offerings in the 
Hess and Frost data sample (274 issues between 
January 1, 197 5 and March 1, 1977) were stabi-
lized. 
3. Data and Results 
In this section we first examine the evi-
dence in favor of the price support theory for 
RLBO underpricing. We then test for the pres-
ence of information asymmetry in order to de-
termine whether RLBO underpricing is attribut-
able to a combination of both factors. 
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A. Statistical evidence of price support 
As in Ruud (1993), returns are measured 
log(P/P0) where Pt is the market price at time t 
and P0 is the offering price. The distributions of 
cross-sectional returns for one day, five days, ten 
days, fifteen days, twenty days and twenty-five 
days are plotted in Figures 1 through 6. Descrip-
tive statistics for these distributions are presented 
in Table 1. From Figure 1 it may be seen that the 
one day distribution is not only peaked but also 
skewed to the right. The skewness and peaked-
ness diminishes with time and, by day twenty-
five, the returns distribution appears much more 
symmetric_. To reinforce these observations, in 
Table 2, the null hypothesis that the log returns 
are drawn from a normal distribution is rejected 
by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test(4,5) at the one 
The sample consists of 120 RLBOs that percent level for the one-day, five-day, and ten 
went public from 1984 through 1990. Data on day distributions and at the five percent level for 
---the firms, the-offer priee,-offer date-and-offer--the-fifteen-day-distribution:-Normalicy-canrrot be 
size were obtained from the Security Data Com- rejected at the five percent level for the twenty 
pany, Inc., New York. The names of the under- and twenty-five day distributions. These results, 
writers were taken from the Directory of Corpo- together with Figures 1 through 6, suggest that 
rate Financing. Returns data were obtained from the early returns distributions are left censored 
the 1990 CRSP tapes for NYSE/AMEX as well but become symmetric with time. Also, in Table 
as NASDAQ firms. Decriptive sample statistics 2 the mean of the returns distribution declines 
are presented in Table 1. with time and the difference between mean and 
Table 1. 


















B: Selected descriptive statistics 
Mean 
Offer Price($) 12.29 
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Table 2. 
Distribution of Log Returns: Rt= log (PJP 0 ) 
N = 120 
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 
Mean 0.0398 0.0386 0.0345 
Median 0.0115 0.0172 0.0118 
Minimum -0.3011 -0.3011 -0.3638 
Maximum 0.7419 0. 7178 0.7178 
Std. Dev. 0.1062 0.1184 0.1398 
Skewness 2.7332 1.9487 1. 4884 
Kurtosis 20.9210 12.5413 9.3165 
Normality *** *** *** 
*** Normality rejected at a= 1% 










CR Unable to reject normality at a 5% 
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median diminishes, consistent with the returns 
distribution becoming more symmetric. Moreo-
ver, the skewness approaches zero with time, in-
It is arguable that multi-day returns con-
verge to a normal distribution due to the central 
limit theorem and independently of any other ef-
--dicating the-return oLs:-ymmetry. -Burther, in -
keeping with the gradual removal of price sup-
port, the range of the negative tail of the distri-
bution moves from -0.30 on day one to -0.74 on 
day twenty-five, whereas the positive tail, since 
there is no upside intervention, hardly moves at 
all (0. 742 on day one to 0.693 on day twenty-
five). Since initial price support truncates the 
negative tail of the returns distribution, excessive 
peakedness, or leptokurtosis, can be expected 
around zero. Once again in Table 2 the decline 
in kurtosis with time suggests the gradual re-
moval of price support. 
- fects such as-the removal of-priGe support. This 
warrants a comparison of one-day returns meas-
ured as log(P/P1_1) at various points following the 
RLBO. These results are in Table 3. The evi-
dence is consistent with the gradual removal of 
price support. By day five the one-day returns 
distribution has a median of zero and a mean that 
fluctuates randomly about zero as does the skew-
ness, suggesting the return to symmetry. The 
one-day distributions are highly leptokurtic, but 
this is consistent with empirical findings on the 
distribution of returns (see Fama 1965). 
Table 3. 
Distribution of Log Returns: Rt= log (Ptf Pt-1) 
N = 120 
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 
Mean 0.0398 -0.0024 0.0023 
Median 0.0115 0 0 
Minimum -0.3011 -0.1044 -0.0770 
Maximum 0.7419 0.0909 0.1011 
Std. Dev. 0.1062 0.0265 0.0261 
Skewness 2.7332 -0.2349 0.7828 
Kurtosis 20.9210 6.1915 6.6575 
Normality *** *** *** 
*** Normality rejected at a 1% 
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Further evidence of price support is ob-
tained by examining offerings with zero initial 
returns that subsequently become negative. In 
our sample there are 23 firms that have initial 
one day returns of zero (see Table 5). Of these, 2 
firms (8.7%) have negative returns on day two, 7 
(30%) have negative returns, on day three, 10 
( 43 % ) have negative returns by day five and 11 
( 48 % ) have negative returns by day ten following 
the RLBO. These findings are consistent with the 
gradual removal of underwriter price support. 
B. Tobit analysis 
If underwriter price support censors the negative 
tail of the initial returns distribution, then returns 
in the negative tail will not be observed and, 
concomitantly, the observed mean is not the true 
mean of the distribution. The class of economet-
ric models used to estimate the parameters of 
· censored data · are known -as to bit models( 6). 
Conditional on information that the sample is 
censored, the tobit model uses maximum likeli-
hood to estimate the sample mean. Under the as-
sumption that underwriter support censors the 
returns sample's one-day return at zero, the true 
mean may estimated using the following model: 
(1) 
where ei - N(0,s2) 
and Ri = Rt if R/ > 0, Ri = 0jf Rt < = 0 
Volume 13, Number 3 
where Ri is the observed return, Rt is the true 
(unobservable if < = 0) return, m is the true 
mean to be estimated with observed data, and ei 
is the random error. Results of the to bit analysis 
are in Table 4. For purposes of comparison, 
arithmetic results are included with the tobit re-
sults. The tobit mean one-day return is -0.0163 
but this is not significantly different from zero: 
In comparison, the arithmetic mean is 0.0398 
and significantly different from zero at the 1 % 
level. These results suggest that RLBOs may not 
actually be underpriced but that the observed un-
derpricing may be due to a left-censored returns 
distribution caused by underwriter price support. 
C. Tests for information asymmetry 
In order to compare our results with 
those of Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989a), we 
tabulate average daily raw returns (measured as 
(Pt ;;. P0)/P0 ) for the twenty trading days follow-
ing the offer date in Table 5. These are consis-
tent with those found by Muscarella and Vet-
suypens (1989a) in that they are considerably less 
than those for IPOs(7,8), which supports the hy-
pothesis that the ex ante uncertainty due to in-
formation asymmetry is less for RLBOs than for 
IPOs. To determine the extent to which the un-
derpricing of RLBOs is attributable to informa-
tion asymmetry, we estimate the regression: 
UNPRi = aa + a1LSIZEi + a2SD20i + a3RPTi + 
a4NSICi + ei 
Table 4. 
Tobit and arithmetic mean estimates for one-day returns of RLBOs 
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where (UNPRi) is the log of the first day's return 
for the RLBOs in the sample. The explanatory 
variables proxy for the degree of information 
asymmetry and control for the underwriter certi-
fication effect. The motivation for these vari-
ables is discussed below. 
LSIZE: The log of the offering size. 
Previous studies(9) have shown that offer size, 
which proxies for uncertainty and the degree of 
information asymmetry, is negatively related to 
the initial return, despite there being no clear 
theoretical explanation for this finding. 
SD20: The standard deviation of twenty-
day after-market returns. Ritter (1984) uses this 
variable to proxy for ex ante uncertainty about 
an issue, as do Barry et al (1990) and Johnson 
and Miller (1988). They find a positive relation 
between underpricing and after-market volatility, 
consistent with- the information asymmetry theo~ 
ries of underpricing. 
RPT: Underwriter reputation. Following 
Carter and Manaster (1990), we rank underwrit-
ers on a scale from O to 9 with the highest-
prestige underwriters at 9 and the lowest at O. 
Under the certification hypothesis, prestigious 
underwriters have more to lose in reputational 
capital if they misprice and, consequently, issues 
underwritten by them should more accurately re-
flect true value. Thus, the more prestigious the 
underwriter, the less should be the underpricing. 
NSIC: Number of firms with the same 
four-digit SIC code as the RLBO. Kale (1992) 
conjectures that the degree of informational 
asymmetry will be negatively correlated with the 
degree of competition in the market for the issue. 
He argues that if there are many firms already in 
the same industry, the industry will have been 
intensively investigated by the market and, con-
sequently, any informational advantage possessed 
by insiders with regard to the future prospects of 
the firm is likely to be less significant. Therefore 
the degree of underpricing would be lower for 
firms with more competition. 
The results of these regressions(lO)are in 
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Table 6. We find that very little of the variation 
in initial returns is explained by the explanatory 
variables, individually or together. The only ex-
planatory variable with marginal significance is 
the underwriter reputation dummy, RPT, which 
controls for the certification effect. The coeffi-
cient has the hypothesized negative sign and im-
plies that more prestigious underwriters are asso-
ciated with less underpriced RLBOs. This result 
is consistent with Carter and Manaster (1990). 
The size and volatility variables which have been 
consistently significant in IPO studies(l 1) appear 
to have no explanatory power. The competition 
variable, NSIC, fares no better than size and 
volatility in explaining the variation in initial un-
derpricing. These results indicate that, unlike 
IPOs, RLBOs have little or no ex ante uncer-
tainty caused by information asymmetry when 
they go to the market. To the extent the informa-
tion differential between the firm and the market 
-in the case- of-RLBOs is so low, our results sup-
port the assertion of Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989a) that RLBOs have less information 
asymmetry than IPOs. However, in the absence 
of information . asymmetry for RLBOs and in 
light of our earlier results in favor of price sup-
port, we conclude that the underpricing of these 
firms is consistent with the hypothesis of under-
writer price support. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine a sample of 
120 firms that were publicly traded, were taken 
private in leveraged buyouts and then went pub-
lic again (RLBOs). Underpricing when these 
firms go public for the second time could be the 
result of information asymmetry between the 
firm and the market or due to underwriter price 
support in the after-market. Our results indicate 
that there is very little information asymmetry 
between the firm and the market in the case of 
RLBOs, and are consistent with the hypothesis 
that initial positive RLBO returns are due to un-
derwriter price support. 
Implications For Future Research 
Reverse leveraged buyouts are entities 
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Table 5. 























































































*** Significant at a= 1% 
Table 6. 
Regression Results 
























Model: UNPRi = ao + a 1LSIZEi + a 2SD2 0i + a 3RPTi + a 4NSICi + ei 
a a a a a 
0 .0319 0 .-0003 
(0.18) (0.03) 
0.0291 0.3107 
(1. 21) (0. 35) 
0.1117 -0.0107* 
(2. 37) (-1. 66) 
0.0432 -0.0002 
( 3. 63) (-1. 00) 
-0.079 0.0129 0.0492 -0. 0144* -0.0002 
(-0.4) ( 1. 03) (0. 05) (-1. 85) (-0.81) 
UNPRi = Day 1 Log Return for Firm i 







SD20i = Standard Deviation of 20-day returns for firm i 







NSICi = Number of firms in the same industry as the issuing firm 
* Significant at 10%. 
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that have received little scrutiny in the finance 
literature. Even the theoretical arguments that are 
applied to RLBOs come mainly from the litera-
ture on Initial Public Offerings. While these 
theories are, to some extent, applicable to 
RLBOs, other than intuitive reasoning there is no 
explicit theoretical basis, for example, why in-
formation asymmetry should be less for RLBOs 
than for IPOs. At the empirical level, while some 
work has been done, it would no doubt help 
clarify matters if a larger sample or a longer time 
frame could be examined. m 
Endnotes 
1. See, for example, Smith (1986), Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and Ritter (1984). 
2. See Baron (1982), Rock (1986), Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Tinic (1988), Welch (1988), 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt 
-and Hwang (1989)-:- These-are discussed 
briefly in the next section. 
3. This paragraph draws heavily from Ruud 
(1993) where the regulatory and legal as-
pects of the 1934 Securities Act as well as 
the mechanics of price support are dis-
cussed at length. 
4. Similar results were also obtained by the 
parametric skewness-kurtosis test. 
5. The intent is not to demonstrate that the 
returns distribution is normal, but rather 
that it is symmetric. 
6. See Maddala (1983). 
7. For the sample in this study, the first day's 
mean daily return is 4.28%, compared to 
2.04% found by Muscarella and Vet-
suypens. The difference could be due to 
the fact that their sample runs from 1983 
through July 1987, while ours runs from 
1984 through 1990. Even in the overlap-
ping period 1984-1987, the number of 
RLBOs in their sample is not the same as 
that in ours. 
8. Ritter (1984) finds a mean one-day return 
of 48.4% during the "hot issue" market of 
1980, and a mean one-day return of 16. 3 % 
during the remainder of the 1977-82 pe-
riod. Ruud (1993) finds a more modest 
6.38% return during the 1982-83 period. 
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For the 1978-87 period and using a larger 
sample, Barry et al (1990) find a 7.47% 
mean return for 1120 non-venture-capital-
backed IPOs, and 8.43% mean return for 
430 venture-capital-backed IPOs. 
9. See Ritter (1984), Chalk and Peavy (1990). 
10. We also estimated these regressions using 
the raw one-day return as the dependent 
variable. The results were similar to those 
in Table 5 and are not reported here. 
11. For example, Barry et al (1990), Johnson 
and Miller (1988). 
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